I analyze how information structure influences the profitability of advance selling in the presence of a competitor. Two firms produce different brands serving heterogeneous consumers. In advance, consumers know the utility they will get from their preferred brand but can be uninformed about its identity, how much they will dislike their nonpreferred brand, or both. The firms set prices in the main selling season (when uncertainty is resolved) simultaneously, but one firm can set an advance selling price (while there is still uncertainty). Competition enhances the profitability of advance selling when consumers are uninformed about which brand they will prefer.

中文翻译：

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提前销售、竞争和品牌替代

我分析了信息结构如何在竞争对手面前影响提前销售的盈利能力。两家公司生产不同的品牌，服务于不同的消费者。事先，消费者知道他们将从他们喜欢的品牌中获得的效用，但可能不知道该品牌的身份，他们会在多大程度上不喜欢他们不喜欢的品牌，或两者兼而有之。公司在主要销售季节（当不确定性消除时）同时设定价格，但一个公司可以设定提前销售价格（当仍然存在不确定性时）。当消费者不知道他们更喜欢哪个品牌时，竞争会提高预售的盈利能力。