Drawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex-ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party's strength and commits to sharing the obtained information with the respective opponent. The conflicting parties can be convinced not to fight each other. The conflicting parties benefit from mediation, as the ex-ante war probability is reduced. The benefit is taken up by weak conflicting parties. This benefit is larger when war is costlier and when the war probability absent mediation is higher.

中文翻译：

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通过贝叶斯说服预防冲突

借鉴贝叶斯说服文献，我表明调解员可以战略性地向冲突各方提供信息，以减少战前战争的可能性。在拥有有关军事实力的私人信息的两方之间的冲突中，调解人生成有关每个冲突方实力的信息，并承诺与各自的对手共享所获得的信息。可以说服冲突各方不要互相争斗。冲突各方从调解中受益，因为战前战争的可能性降低了。利益由弱的冲突方承担。当战争成本更高并且没有调解的战争概率更高时，这种好处更大。