Internalists and externalists fundamentally disagree about how moral judgments motivate. Internalists think that morally good people should have de re desires to do right things, and agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right are moral fetishists. In contrast, externalists accept that morally good people can have both the relevant de re and de dicto desires. My aim is to provide an argument for internalism, which goes beyond the context in which both sides currently debate the relevant de re and de dicto desires. I will first introduce R. Jay Wallace's understanding of a fetish, according to which to have a fetish is to devote interest and attention to objects that do not deserve such responses. Then, I will argue that the relevant de dicto desire in the debate is fetishistic because rightness itself is not a worthwhile goal to have in our moral deliberation and motivation. Moral agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right, even if partly, still count as moral fetishists.

中文翻译：

---

为什么 de dicto 的欲望是恋物癖

内部主义者和外部主义者在道德判断如何激发方面存在根本分歧。内部主义者认为，道德上的好人应该有做正确事情的欲望，而被这种欲望驱使去做任何正确的事情的代理人是道德拜物主义者。相比之下，外部主义者接受道德上的好人可以同时拥有相关的de re和de dicto欲望。我的目的是为内部主义提供一个论据，它超越了双方目前辩论相关的de re和de dicto的背景。愿望。我将首先介绍R. Jay Wallace对恋物癖的理解，据此，拥有恋物癖就是将兴趣和注意力投入到不值得这种反应的对象上。然后，我将争辩说，辩论中相关的独裁欲望是拜物教的，因为在我们的道德思考和动机中，正义本身并不是一个值得拥有的目标。受自言自语驱使的道德代理人渴望做任何正确的事情，即使是部分正确的，仍然算作道德拜物主义者。