The paper focuses on an understudied aspect of the relationship between states and their diasporas—emigration policies attracting diaspora investment. I find that countries with weaker rule of law face particularly strong incentives to adopt diaspora engagement policies and engage in initiatives attracting diaspora investment as opposed to the countries with stronger rule of law. This argument is illustrated through an investment game between migrant investors and governments with different strengths of rule of law. It is tested by using the data from multiple levels of analysis: original and existing data examining the instances when top government officials reach out to their diasporas for investment and bilateral foreign direct investment and migration data.

中文翻译：

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为外国直接投资吸引侨民：侨民参与的条件性质

本文重点关注国家与其侨民之间关系的一个未被充分研究的方面——吸引侨民投资的移民政策。我发现，与法治较强的国家相比，法治较弱的国家在采取侨民参与政策和参与吸引侨民投资的举措方面面临特别强烈的激励。移民投资者与法治实力不同的政府之间的投资博弈说明了这一论点。它通过使用来自多个分析级别的数据进行测试：原始数据和现有数据检查高级政府官员向其侨民寻求投资的实例以及双边外国直接投资和移民数据。