Kant's notion of (what I will call) rational sympathy solves a problem about how we can voluntarily fulfill our imperfect duty to adopt those ends of others which have value only because they have been set by rational agents, ends which I will refer to as merely permissible ends (MPEs). Others' MPEs are individuated in terms of their own concepts of their MPEs, and we can only adopt their MPEs in terms of their concepts, since to adopt them in terms of different concepts would be to adopt different ends. Others' concepts of their MPEs may contain marks of the first person, and should contain no marks of law apart from permissibility. Rational sympathy allows us to adopt ends individuated in terms of concepts with marks of these kinds because rational sympathy allows us to voluntarily adopt others' first-person perspectives in imagination, and to voluntarily shape our contingent feelings so that such concepts motivate us despite their underdetermination by law.

中文翻译：

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康德中的“理性的同情”和他人的结局

康德的（我将称之为）理性同情的概念解决了一个问题，即我们如何能够自愿履行我们不完美的义务，接受他人的那些目的，这些目的仅仅是因为它们是由理性的代理人设定的，我将把这些目的称为仅仅是允许的目的（MPE）。别人的MPE在他们自己对MPE的概念上是个体化的，我们只能在概念上采用他们的MPE，因为在不同的概念上采用它们就是采用不同的目的。其他人对其 MPE 的概念可能包含第一人称的标记，并且除了允许性之外不应包含法律标记。理性的同情使我们能够采用带有此类标记的概念来个体化的目的，因为理性的同情使我们能够自愿地在想象中采用他人的第一人称视角，并自愿地塑造我们的偶然感受，以便这些概念尽管不确定性不足，但仍能激励我们依法。