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Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution
The RAND Journal of Economics ( IF 2.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-02 , DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12374
Benjamin Balzer 1 , Johannes Schneider 2
Affiliation  

We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-independent. It is ex ante fair and decreases the disputants' expenditures, even if they fail to settle. We highlight the importance of real-world mediation techniques, such as caucusing, for implementing optimal ADR.

中文翻译:

管理冲突:最佳替代性争议解决方案

我们研究替代性争议解决 (ADR) 的最佳方法,这是一种实现和解并避免代价高昂的对抗性听证会的技术。参与是自愿的。争论者私下被告知他们提供证据的边际成本。如果 ADR 未能达成和解,争议方可以使用 ADR 期间获得的信息来确定在对抗性听证会上提供哪些证据。最优 ADR 会导致不对称的信息结构,但使学习报告独立。这是事前公平的,减少了争议方的开支,即使他们未能和解。我们强调了现实世界调解技术(例如预选会议)对于实现最佳 ADR 的重要性。
更新日期:2021-06-11
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