Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

中文翻译：

---

没有指导的认识论

认识论者经常诉诸于这样一种观点，即规范理论必须提供有用的、可用的指导，以支持一种规范认识论而不是另一种规范认识论。我认为这是一个错误。指导考虑在认识论的理论选择中没有作用。我展示了这对关于认知困境的可能性和范围、贝叶斯认识论中理想化的合法性、独特性与宽容主义、尖锐与模糊的信任以及内在主义与外在主义的辩论有何影响。