Based on real options theory and institutional factors, we develop a theoretical framework for investment in the presence of corruption and use a sample of private firms in 13 European countries over 2001–2013 to carry out the first large-scale analysis of the impact of the level of corruption and uncertainty about corruption on post-entry investment of MNE subsidiaries. We employ several waves of managerial surveys (the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; BEEPS) to construct local- rather than merely country-level measures of corruption level and uncertainty. In combination with a large European firm-level database (Amadeus), we show that corruption uncertainty and corruption level do not have an effect on the investment of MNE subsidiaries. We next carry out the analysis on the sample of domestic firms and find a negative investment effect that is driven primarily by corruption uncertainty rather than corruption level. We also show that investment of domestic firms that are similar (matched) to MNE subsidiaries is unaffected directly by corruption, but is affected by uncertainties related to finances and judiciary. Our results are robust to controlling for various types of uncertainty, and they provide new insights into the effects of corruption on investment.

基于实物期权理论和制度因素，我们开发了一个存在腐败的投资理论框架，并使用 2001-2013 年间 13 个欧洲国家的私营企业样本，对腐败的影响进行了首次大规模分析。腐败程度和对腐败的不确定性对跨国公司子公司的进入后的投资。我们采用了几波管理调查（商业环境和企业绩效调查；BEEPS）来构建本地而不是国家层面的腐败水平和不确定性指标. 结合大型欧洲公司级数据库（Amadeus），我们表明腐败不确定性和腐败水平对跨国公司子公司的投资没有影响。我们接下来对国内企业样本进行分析，发现主要由腐败不确定性而不是腐败水平驱动的负投资效应。我们还表明，与跨国公司子公司相似（匹配）的国内公司的投资不受腐败的直接影响，但会受到与财务和司法相关的不确定性的影响。我们的结果对于控制各种类型的不确定性是稳健的，它们为腐败对投资的影响提供了新的见解。