Extant studies have focused on conceptualizing and measuring the general quality of the institutions and their impact on an array of firms’ strategies. We distinguish two dimensions of institutional inefficiencies in a host country – generalized and arbitrary – and theorize from a knowledge perspective their impact on the acquirers’ ownership decisions in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Our empirical examination of 5522 CBAs by firms entering emerging economies reveals that, when exposed to a higher level of host-country generalized institutional inefficiencies, the acquirer tends to take a lower ownership in a CBA. When exposed to higher levels of arbitrary institutional inefficiencies, however, the acquirer tends to take a higher ownership in a CBA. We further find that these relationships are contingent upon the acquirer’s experience in the host region and technological nature.

现有的研究侧重于概念化和衡量制度的总体质量及其对一系列公司战略的影响。我们区分了东道国制度效率低下的两个维度——广义和任意性——并从知识角度对它们对跨境收购 (CBA) 中收购方所有权决策的影响进行了理论分析。我们对进入新兴经济体的公司的 5522 份 CBA 的实证研究表明，当东道国普遍制度效率低下时，收购方往往会持有较低的 CBA 所有权。当暴露于更高级别的任意然而，由于制度效率低下，收购方倾向于在 CBA 中拥有更高的所有权。我们进一步发现，这些关系取决于收购方在东道国的经验和技术性质。