Upstream collusion that increases the price of an input can harm an independent downstream producer (D). We ask whether this harm is more or less pronounced when D’s downstream rival is a vertically integrated producer. We find that such vertical integration increases D’s loss from collusion when D is not a particularly strong competitor. However, when D is a sufficiently strong competitor, vertical integration can reduce D’s loss from collusion when price competition prevails downstream.

中文翻译：

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纵向一体化对串通损失的影响

提高投入品价格的上游勾结可能损害独立的下游生产商 (D)。我们询问，当 D 的下游竞争对手是垂直整合的生产商时，这种损害是否或多或少明显。我们发现，当 D 不是特别强大的竞争者时，这种垂直整合会增加 D 的共谋损失。然而，当 D 是一个足够强大的竞争者时，垂直整合可以减少 D 在下游价格竞争盛行时因勾结而造成的损失。