The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead firms (senders) to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that consumers (receivers) hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers are naïve and do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition between senders increases unravelling and decreases receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information. We find that while complete unravelling fails to occur, competition between senders significantly increases unravelling and receivers' overall welfare. Receivers' welfare increases despite no significant difference in their guesses or beliefs about non-disclosed information relative to the treatment without competition, and this is driven by higher rates of disclosure by senders. We conclude that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare.

信息自愿披露理论认为，市场力量引导企业（发送者）通过一个拆散的过程来披露信息。这种预测要求消费者（接收者）持有正确的信念，并在均衡状态下对未公开的信息做出不利的推断。先前的研究发现，接收者很天真，没有充分推断不披露是坏消息，导致完全解开的失败。本文通过实验检验了发送者之间的竞争是否会增加解开并减少接收者对未公开信息的天真。我们发现，虽然无法完全解开，但发送者之间的竞争显着增加了解开和接收者的整体福利。接收者 尽管与没有竞争的处理相比，他们对非披露信息的猜测或信念没有显着差异，但福利增加了，这是由发送者更高的披露率驱动的。我们得出结论，发送者之间的竞争对信息披露和接收者的福利有积极影响。