ABSTRACT

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are known to be a necessary component to achieve sustainable peace after an armed conflict. The main goal of this type of program is to help the transition for former soldiers from war to a sustainable legal economic activity. However, due to weak institutions and poor design and implementation, such programs often result in many former soldiers ending up unemployed, in criminal activities, or returning to armed rebel groups. In this paper, I propose an optimal reintegration contract using tools from unemployment insurance literature. In this model, a principal (government) collects taxes from the community to fund a reintegration program that gives incentives to agents (insurgent soldiers) to leave war and search for a job. I describe how information asymmetries and the conditions of labor and crime markets shape the benefits scheme offered by the principal and the selection of insurgents who join the reintegration program.

摘要

众所周知，解除武装、复员和重返社会 (DDR) 计划是实现武装冲突后可持续和平的必要组成部分。此类计划的主要目标是帮助退伍军人从战争过渡到可持续的合法经济活动。然而，由于机构薄弱以及设计和实施不力，此类计划往往导致许多退伍军人最终失业、从事犯罪活动或重返武装叛乱团体。在本文中，我使用失业保险文献中的工具提出了一个最优的重返社会合同。在这个模型中，委托人（政府）向社区征税以资助重返社会计划，该计划激励代理人（叛乱士兵）离开战争并寻找工作。