This article considers the national industrial relations policy aspects of the economic recovery agenda in Australia, in the context of the theory of monopsonistic competition, employment and productivity. This framework acknowledges the employer ability to exercise discretion in the setting of wages. The proposed reforms were unlikely to lead to any increase in economic growth through higher labour productivity or employment. Proposed agendas in enterprise bargaining, greenfields agreements and award simplification (as well as union regulation), would principally have reduced labour costs and incomes. In many circumstances, allowing employers to offer lower wages may lead to fewer filled jobs, higher labour turnover and absenteeism and lower employment. The incentive on employers to improve labour productivity may fall. Proposals to more energetically punish wage theft may have had the opposite effects, but these were abandoned by the government despite support from the other parties. In the end, the only part of the reform agenda to pass Parliament concerned changes to the definition and treatment of casual employees, but casual employment grew strongly before the Bill took effect, the crisis the Bill was meant to solve eased before the Bill was passed, and even if successful the changes would have done little to boost labour productivity.

JEL Codes: D43, J31, J38

本文在垄断竞争、就业和生产力理论的背景下，考虑了澳大利亚经济复苏议程的国家劳资关系政策方面。该框架承认雇主在设定工资时行使自由裁量权的能力。拟议的改革不太可能通过提高劳动生产率或就业来促进经济增长。企业谈判、绿地协议和奖励简化（以及工会监管）方面的拟议议程主要会降低劳动力成本和收入。在许多情况下，允许雇主提供较低的工资可能会导致职位空缺、劳动力流动和旷工增加以及就业减少。雇主提高劳动生产率的动力可能会下降。更积极地惩罚盗窃工资的提议可能产生了相反的效果，但尽管得到了其他党派的支持，但政府还是放弃了这些提议。最终，议会通过的唯一改革议程涉及临时雇员的定义和待遇的变化，但临时就业在法案生效之前强劲增长，法案旨在解决的危机在法案通过之前得到缓解，即使成功，这些变化对提高劳动生产率也无济于事。

JEL 代码： D43、J31、J38