The most natural way to distinguish perception from cognition is by considering perception as stimulus-dependent. Perception is tethered to the senses in a way that cognition is not. Beck Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 319-334 (2018) has recently argued in this direction. He develops this idea by accommodating two potential counterexamples to his account: hallucinations and demonstrative thoughts. In this paper, I examine this view. First, I detect two general problems with movement to accommodate these awkward cases. Subsequently, I place two very common mental phenomena under the prism of the stimulus-dependence criterion: amodal completion and visual categorization. The result is that the stimulus-dependent criterion is too restrictive, it leaves the notion of perception extremely cramped. I conclude that even the criterion of stimulus-dependence fails to mark a clearly defined border between perception and cognition.

区分感知与认知的最自然方法是将感知视为依赖于刺激。知觉与感官联系在一起，而认知则不然。贝克澳大拉西亚哲学杂志96(2): 319-334 (2018) 最近在这个方向上进行了争论。他通过将两个潜在的反例纳入他的叙述来发展这个想法：幻觉和示范性想法。在这篇论文中，我检验了这个观点。首先，我检测到移动的两个一般问题以适应这些尴尬的情况。随后，我将两种非常常见的心理现象置于刺激依赖标准的棱镜之下：无模态完成和视觉分类。结果是刺激依赖的标准过于严格，它使感知的概念非常局促。我的结论是，即使是刺激依赖的标准也未能在知觉和认知之间划出明确的界限。