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On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor
Economic Theory ( IF 1.423 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-31 , DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01372-7
Pavlo Prokopovych , Nicholas C. Yannelis

This paper investigates the existence of a nondegenerate pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a double auction between one seller and several heterogeneous buyers in the independent private value framework. It begins with three examples describing some of the model’s particular features. After studying a number of continuity-related properties of the interim payoff functions, we construct a sequence of strategy profiles that converges to a nondegenerate monotone Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game under some strict monotonicity conditions. The equilibrium existence result is applied to a double auction with risk-averse bidders.



中文翻译:

关于多买家和价格下限的双重拍卖的非退化均衡

本文研究了独立私人价值框架中一个卖家和几个异类买家之间的双重拍卖中非退化纯策略贝叶斯-纳什均衡的存在。它以三个示例开始,描述了该模型的一些特定功能。在研究了中期收益函数的一些与连续性相关的特性之后,我们构建了一系列策略配置文件,这些配置文件在一些严格的单调性条件下收敛到博弈的非退化单调贝叶斯-纳什均衡。均衡存在结果适用于风险规避投标人的双重拍卖。

更新日期:2021-05-31
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