We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games.

中文翻译：

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有一个积极的后卫改变政权

我们分析了一个政权更迭游戏，在这个游戏中，积极的防御者可以投资于昂贵的、不可观察的防御。我们表明，如果有足够多的潜在攻击者，则博弈具有独特的纳什均衡，其中防御者选择几乎没有防御并且攻击几乎从不发生。这为协调问题提供了一个新的视角，也为政权更迭游戏中的改进提供了新的视角。