Typically, the WTO Arbitrator, when charged with evaluating the permissible level of countermeasures (suspension of concessions), has chosen a counterfactual state of the world where the challenged (illegal) measure has not been adopted at all. The Arbitrator then would calculate the trade lost because of the adopted (illegal) measure, and thus, decide on the level of permissible countermeasures. In US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US), deviating from this custom, the Arbitrator adopted a different counterfactual, assuming that the complainant had adopted a different, ‘reasonable’ measure. The Arbitrator then evaluated the trade lost based on the distance between the adopted (illegal) and the ‘reasonable’ measure and calculated the level of countermeasures. In this paper, we explain the multitude of perils facing dispute settlement if this approach is adopted in future disputes. We also advance a few thoughts on rethinking the workings of the Arbitrator when measuring the level of permissible countermeasures, since similar slippery slopes risk being reproduced in future cases.

中文翻译：

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如果？修补反事实：对美国洗衣机的评论（第 22.6-US 条）

通常情况下，WTO 仲裁员在负责评估反措施（暂停让步）的允许水平时，会选择一个世界上的反事实状态，在该状态下，被质疑的（非法）措施根本没有被采用。然后，仲裁员将计算由于采用（非法）措施而造成的贸易损失，从而决定允许的反措施水平。在美式洗衣机（美国第 22.6 条），仲裁员偏离了这一惯例，采用了不同的反事实，假设申诉人采取了不同的“合理”措施。然后，仲裁员根据所采用（非法）措施与“合理”措施之间的距离评估交易损失，并计算出反措施的水平。在本文中，我们解释了如果在未来的争端中采用这种方法，争端解决面临的众多风险。我们还提出了一些关于在衡量允许的对策水平时重新考虑仲裁员的工作方式的想法，因为类似的滑坡可能会在未来的案例中重现。