Previous research has analysed a range of domestic stakeholders that make national governments’ commitments to international human rights law credible, including an independent judiciary, legislative veto players, political opposition groups, and non-governmental organizations. But how do the power dynamics within the government affect state compliance with international human rights law? Building on the basic understanding that international human rights law needs to pass through domestic political and administrative processes before it can be implemented on the ground, this article articulates a reputation-based theoretical framework to explain how the lack of reputational mechanisms at the local level and national leaders’ shifting of blame for non-compliance to sub-national officials and the internal governance structure – two salient characteristics in a decentralized political system – make international human rights law less effective. A case study of US compliance with Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations sheds light on how international reputational concerns interact with divided authority structure to shape national leaders’ and subnational authorities’ policy responses to the enforcement of international human rights standards.

中文翻译：

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分裂的政府结构和国家对国际人权法的遵守：基于声誉的方法

先前的研究分析了一系列使国家政府对国际人权法的承诺可信的国内利益相关者，包括独立的司法机构、立法否决权参与者、政治反对团体和非政府组织。但政府内部的权力动态如何影响国家对国际人权法的遵守？基于国际人权法需要通过国内政治和行政程序才能在当地实施的基本理解，本文阐述了一个基于声誉的理论框架，以解释地方层面缺乏声誉机制和国家领导人如何将不合规的责任推卸给地方官员和内部治理结构——分散政治的两个显着特征制度——降低国际人权法的效力。美国遵守 1963 年《维也纳领事关系公约》第 36 条的案例研究揭示了国际声誉问题如何与分权结构相互作用，从而塑造国家领导人和地方当局对执行国际人权标准的政策反应。