Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.

自愿披露的经典模型具有两种经济力量：逆向选择问题的存在（例如，经理拥有一些私人信息）和改善问题的成本（例如，与披露相关的成本）。传统上，这些力是独立建模的。在本文中，我们使用一个简单的模型在这些力量共同确定的环境中激发经验预测——在这种情况下，更大的逆向选择需要更大的披露成本。我们表明，这些力量的联合确定在自愿披露的概率中产生了明显的非线性。我们发现，这种非线性从经验上描述了两种不同的经验环境中自愿披露的多种措施，这些环境通常被认为具有私人信息和专有成本：