We introduce two families of values for TU-games: the recursive and bargaining values. Bargaining values are obtained as the equilibrium payoffs of the symmetric non-cooperative bargaining game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We show that bargaining values have a recursive structure in their definition, and we call this property recursiveness. All efficient, linear, and symmetric values that satisfy recursiveness are called recursive values. We generalize the notions of potential, and balanced contributions property, to characterize the family of recursive values. Finally, we show that if a time discount factor is considered in the bargaining model, every bargaining value has its corresponding discounted bargaining value.

我们为 TU 游戏引入了两个值系列：递归值和讨价还价值。讨价还价是作为对称非合作讨价还价博弈的均衡收益获得的，该博弈由 Hart 和 Mas-Colell (1996) 提出。我们证明了讨价还价值在其定义中具有递归结构，我们称这种属性为递归性。所有满足递归性的有效、线性和对称值都称为递归值。我们概括了潜在和平衡贡献属性的概念，以表征递归值族。最后，我们证明如果在讨价还价模型中考虑时间折扣因素，则每个讨价还价值都有其相应的折现值。