ABSTRACT

Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus denied the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers.

摘要

法兰克福式案例 (FSC) 似乎引发了一种直觉判断，即尽管无法采取其他行动，但代理人仍负有道德责任，这被认为是对替代可能性原则 (PAP) 的证伪。最近的实证研究表明，人们对这种直觉判断的倾向是一致的，这似乎强化了反对行动党的论点。然而，一些学者提出了描述性反直觉主义（Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism，DAI）——直觉判断在哲学中从未发挥过证据作用——因此否认了这种实证研究结果的哲学意义。我指出，尽管 DAI 对 FSC 的字面主张失败了，但相关的洞察力仍然有效：直觉判断非常脆弱，很容易被进一步的论据打败。尽管如此，我认为，实证研究对于揭示我们在实践中关于道德责任的一般原则具有重要意义。我通过追溯法兰克福和哲学家的文献来阐明这些发现如何在有关道德责任的哲学辩论中发挥强有力的证据作用。