Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish conditions under which there exists a tradeoff in addressing underinsurance and underenrollment. I then estimate a model of the California ACA insurance exchange using consumer-level data to quantify the welfare impact of risk adjustment and the individual mandate. I find (1) risk adjustment reduces underinsurance, but reduces enrollment and (2) the mandate increases enrollment, but increases underinsurance.

中文翻译：

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管理逆向选择：保险不足与入学不足

保险市场中的逆向选择可能会导致一些消费者投保不足或购买相对于社会最优水平的保险的消费者太少。我研究了共同的政府政策干预是否可以减轻因逆向选择导致的保险不足和入学不足。我建立了在解决保险不足和注册不足方面存在权衡的条件。然后，我使用消费者级别的数据来估计加利福尼亚 ACA 保险交易所的模型，以量化风险调整和个人授权的福利影响。我发现（1）风险调整减少了保险不足，但减少了参保人数；（2）授权增加了参保人数，但增加了参保不足。