This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third-degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition between firms. These results hold under first-degree price discrimination, which is a limit case when information is perfect.

中文翻译：

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在数字竞争市场中销售战略信息

本文调查了数据经纪人向一个或两个竞争公司出售信息的策略。数据经纪人结合了消费者需求的各个部分，允许公司对消费者进行三级价格歧视。我们表明数据经纪人（1）出售具有最高支付意愿的消费者的信息；(2)使支付意愿低的消费者不明。数据经纪人战略性地选择隐瞒有关消费者需求的信息，以缓和公司之间的竞争。这些结果在一级价格歧视下成立，这是信息完美时的极限情况。