In this paper, we consider an imperfect production-inventory system which consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer delivers the order quantity to the retailer in some unequal-sized batches. To separate the defective items, the retailer performs an error-free screening process after receiving each delivery from the manufacturer. Shortage in retailer's inventory is allowed and completely backlogged. The customer demand is influenced by the retail price, advertisement frequency and greening level of the product. The centralized model and the decentralized model based on a Stackelberg gaming approach are developed to determine optimal pricing, advertising and inventory decisions. A cost-sharing contract between the manufacturer and the retailer is implemented, which enhances the environmental performance, advertisement frequency and profitability of the supply chain significantly. The proposed model is illustrated with a numerical example. Sensitivity analysis for some key parameters is carried out and several managerial insights are also highlighted.

在本文中，我们考虑了一个由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的不完善的生产-库存系统。制造商以不等大小的批次将订单数量交付给零售商。为了区分有缺陷的物品，零售商在收到制造商的每次交付后都会执行无差错筛选过程。允许零售商库存短缺，并且完全积压。客户需求受产品零售价格、广告频率和绿化程度的影响。开发基于 Stackelberg 博弈方法的集中式模型和分散式模型以确定最优定价、广告和库存决策。实施制造商和零售商之间的成本分摊合同，提高了环境绩效，广告频率和供应链的盈利能力显着。所提出的模型用一个数值例子来说明。对一些关键参数进行了敏感性分析，并强调了一些管理见解。