The process of commencing services based on 5G technology has begun. One condition for starting up 5G technology is the distribution of the frequencies required for the provision of those services. For the first time in the process of making frequencies available, requirements have arisen pertaining to the security of the infrastructure necessary for the provision of those services. In the EU, recommendations have been drawn up, based in particular on an NISCG report entitled Cybersecurity of 5G networks EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures. In this article, an analysis is made of the implementation of those recommendations concerning suppliers of infrastructure, based on examples from selected EU countries, in order to ensure that such assessments are objective and transparent. In some cases, the provisions implementing the recommendations do not fully protect the fundamental rights of the entities assessed as foreseen in EU and domestic law, particularly the right to a fair trial before an independent court. I propose certain changes in the regulations pertaining to suppliers of telecommunications equipment.

基于 5G 技术的服务进程已经开始。启动 5G 技术的一个条件是分配提供这些服务所需的频率。在提供频率的过程中，第一次出现了与提供这些服务所需的基础设施安全相关的要求。在欧盟，已经起草了建议，特别是基于一份题为5G 网络的网络安全欧盟风险缓解措施工具箱的 NISCG 报告. 在本文中，基于选定的欧盟国家的示例，分析了这些有关基础设施供应商的建议的实施情况，以确保此类评估是客观和透明的。在某些情况下，实施建议的条款并未充分保护欧盟和国内法所预见的实体的基本权利，特别是在独立法院获得公平审判的权利。我建议对有关电信设备供应商的法规进行某些更改。