Green product development depends on the green innovation behavior of upstream and downstream companies in the supply chain. This paper focuses on a green supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer and considers two financing schemes wherein the manufacturer’s operating capital and green innovation capital are both constrained: bank credit financing (BCF) and supplier green investment (SGI). We investigate the financing strategy of a manufacturer with different financing decision preferences and supply chain coordination contract designs. The results show that when the manufacturer’s financing decision preference is low bankruptcy risk, it should choose BCF when the bank loan interest rate is lower than a threshold and SGI when the bank loan interest rate is higher than this threshold; when the manufacturer’s financing decision preference is high R&D benefit, it should choose BCF when the initial capital is lower than another threshold and choose SGI when the initial capital is higher than this threshold. Then, we compare whether cost-sharing, quantity discount and revenue-sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain, and discuss the selection strategies of supply chain members for coordination contracts. Research shows that revenue-sharing contracts fail to coordinate; however, when the cost-sharing ratio and quantity discount rate are appropriate, both cost-sharing and quantity discount contracts can achieve supply chain coordination. The lower the supplier’s unit production cost, the stronger its motivation to accept a higher cost-sharing ratio and quantity discount rate. For the supplier, the key to choosing any coordination contract lies in the relative height of the cost-sharing ratio and quantity discount rate while the manufacturer should always choose a quantity discount contract when the quantity discount rate is high enough.

绿色产品开发依赖于供应链上下游企业的绿色创新行为。本文关注由供应商和制造商组成的绿色供应链，并考虑两种融资方案，其中制造商的运营资本和绿色创新资本都受到约束：银行信贷融资（BCF）和供应商绿色投资（SGI）。我们调查了具有不同融资决策偏好和供应链协调合同设计的制造商的融资策略。结果表明，当制造商的融资决策偏好为低破产风险时，银行贷款利率低于阈值时应选择BCF，银行贷款利率高于该阈值时应选择SGI；当制造商的融资决策偏好为高研发收益时，当初始资本低于另一个阈值时应选择BCF，当初始资本高于此阈值时应选择SGI。然后，我们比较了成本分摊、数量折扣和收益分享合同是否可以协调供应链，并讨论供应链成员对协调合同的选择策略。研究表明，收益分享合同无法协调；但是，当成本分摊比例和数量折扣率合适时，成本分摊合同和数量折扣合同都可以实现供应链协调。供应商的单位生产成本越低，其接受更高的成本分摊率和数量折扣率的动机就越强。对于供应商，