ABSTRACT

In India, most healthcare expenses are patients’ out-of-pocket payments to private sector providers. Catastrophic health expenditures drive millions of families deeper into poverty. To save poorer households, hundreds of government-funded health insurance schemes have been introduced since the 2000s. These “demand side” schemes suggest that treatments in the private sector will be fully reimbursed. Fieldwork in one of India’s largest hospitals shows that GFHIs overpromise. GFHIs are designed to turn patients into co-creators of healthcare value, but instead they deepen individuals’ lack of market transparency. Poor patients pay the price for the state’s lack of trust in them.

摘要

在印度，大多数医疗保健费用是患者向私营部门提供者的自付费用。灾难性的医疗支出使数百万家庭陷入更深的贫困。为了拯救贫困家庭，自 2000 年代以来，已经推出了数百个政府资助的健康保险计划。这些“需求方”计划表明私营部门的治疗将得到全额报销。在印度最大的医院之一进行的实地调查表明，GFHI 的承诺过高。GFHI 旨在将患者转变为医疗保健价值的共同创造者，但它们反而加深了个人缺乏市场透明度的情况。可怜的病人为国家对他们缺乏信任付出了代价。