Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

双过程理论将认知分为两种过程：第一类过程是自主的，不使用工作记忆，第二类过程与直接情境解耦并使用工作记忆。通常，类型 1 过程也是快速的、高容量的、并行的、无意识的、有偏见的、情境化的和关联的，而类型 2 的过程通常是缓慢的、低容量的、串行的、有意识的、规范的、抽象的和基于规则的。本文主张基于马丁·海德格尔现象学的具身双重过程理论。根据海德格尔的说法，人类行为体与世界相遇的基础是一种前反思的、务实的性格，其特点是随时可用（Zuhandenheit)，有时等同于“平稳应对”。平稳应对的例子包括步行、扔球和其他不需要反思的具体行动。我认为平稳应对主要由类型 1 过程组成。海德格尔的双过程模型产生了与休伯特·德雷福斯的平稳应对模型截然不同的假设，我将批判性地参与德雷福斯的工作。