ABSTRACT

How does the coordination strategy of interest groups change during a crisis? Shocks reduce an economy's resource pool and increase the competition for what is available. Interest groups participate in the policy-making process by lobbying legislators. In times of crisis, we argue, interest groups lobbying Congress coordinate in cohesive industry-wide communities led by key actors. Rather than lobbying for narrow policy privileges, interest groups seek to support legislation that is most beneficial to their community. To study the cooperative behaviour of interest groups we build an original network dataset based on committee participation in the Ecuadorian Congress between 1996 and 2015. We present evidence of increasingly homophilic industry networks in times of crisis, with umbrella organisations taking the role of hubs. We find that ‘lone wolf’ strategies, prevalent during an economic expansion, are less prevalent during a crisis.

摘要

利益集团在危机中的协调策略如何变化？冲击减少了一个经济体的资源库，并增加了对可用资源的竞争。利益集团通过游说立法者参与决策过程。我们认为，在危机时期，游说国会的利益集团在主要参与者领导的有凝聚力的全行业社区中进行协调。利益集团不是游说狭隘的政策特权，而是寻求支持对其社区最有利的立法。为了研究利益集团的合作行为，我们基于 1996 年至 2015 年厄瓜多尔议会的委员会参与情况构建了一个原始网络数据集。我们提供了危机时期日益同质化的行业网络的证据，伞式组织发挥了枢纽的作用。