ABSTRACT

This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.

摘要

本文表明，在某些时候至少部分关注幸福水平的优先主义版本与审慎价值和审慎理性的传统观点相冲突。所谓的时间片优先主义和赋予时间片重要性的多元主义观点认为，利益越重要，受益人在接受时的境况越差。我们表明，根据这一观点评估结果的观点意味着延迟满足的代理人会使结果变得更糟，即使它对代理人更好而对其他人没有好处。我们以此表明时间片优先主义和一些多元主义观点违反了弱帕累托，我们认为这些版本的优先主义是不可信的。