We investigate to what degree employee representatives contribute to the board’s monitoring of earnings quality. We argue that employee representatives have incentives to prevent earnings manipulations motivated by negotiation considerations. Furthermore, they seek risk reducing policies, have a long-term interest in their firm and possess firm-specific knowledge, which in turn can result in improved earnings quality. Employee representation also increases the diversity on the board, which can enhance the board of directors’ internal communication and monitoring. Using a sample of firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2006–2014), we find lower abnormal accruals as well as less excessive R&D cuts in firms with employee representation, controlling for alternative model specifications and potential sample selection bias. Moreover, we find less income-decreasing abnormal accruals in firms with employee representatives during the 2010-2011 collective bargaining period. This study also reveals that earnings quality varies with the characteristics of employee representatives. Our findings contribute to the literature on boards’ monitoring and financial reporting quality, as it examines a less noticed aspect of board diversity, i.e. employee representation.

我们调查了员工代表在多大程度上对董事会对盈利质量的监控做出了贡献。我们认为，员工代表有动机防止出于谈判考虑而进行的收益操纵。此外，他们寻求降低风险的政策，对他们的公司有长期兴趣并拥有公司特定的知识，这反过来可以提高盈利质量。员工代表也增加了董事会的多样性，这可以加强董事会的内部沟通和监督。使用在斯德哥尔摩证券交易所上市的公司样本（2006-2014），我们发现在有员工代表的公司中，异常应计项目较低，研发削减也较少，控制了替代模型规范和潜在的样本选择偏差。而且，我们发现在 2010-2011 年集体谈判期间，有员工代表的公司减少收入的异常应计项目较少。本研究还揭示了盈利质量随着员工代表的特征而变化。我们的发现有助于研究董事会监督和财务报告质量的文献，因为它检查了董事会多元化中一个不太受关注的方面，即员工代表。