Drawing from quantitative and qualitative research, this paper explores the case of COPASA – a mixed-capital regional water and sanitation utility in Brazil facing a context of austerity and privatization. We find that the state government, shrinking in a fiscal crisis, opted to increase extraordinary dividends payouts to raise its revenues. Given the mixed company mode of privatization, the private shareholders endorsed this pattern of governance, motivated by a short sight financial logic. This convergence of different interests led the utility to lower investments, failed investment plans, breaches of contracts with municipalities and making it even harder to universalize the services.

本文从定量和定性研究的角度出发，探讨了COPASA的案例。COPASA是巴西面临紧缩和私有化背景下的混合资本区域供水和卫生设施。我们发现，在财政危机中萎缩的州政府选择增加非常规股利支付以增加其收入。鉴于公司私有化的混合模式，私人股东赞成这种治理模式，这是出于短期财务逻辑的驱动。不同利益的融合导致公用事业公司降低投资，失败的投资计划，与市政当局的合同违约，使服务的普遍化更加困难。