We model a moral hazard in teams problem in which a profit-maximizing principal offers private contracts to multiple agents. Public contracts are common knowledge to all agents, but private contracts are known only by the principal and each individual agent. Public contracts can induce efficient outcomes but are subject to effort-reducing collusion between the principal and any given agent. Private contracts, by construction, are immune to such collusion but necessarily inefficient, as the principal is forced to make the team collectively the residual claimant (on margin), whereas efficiency requires that each individual agent be the residual claimant on his own.

中文翻译：

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私人承包下的团队激励

我们对团队问题中的道德风险进行建模，其中利润最大化的委托人向多个代理提供私人合同。公共合同是所有代理人的常识，但私人合同只有委托人和每个代理人知道。公共合同可以产生有效的结果，但受制于委托人和任何特定代理人之间减少工作量的勾结。从构造上讲，私人合同不受这种串通的影响，但效率必然低下，因为委托人被迫使团队集体成为剩余索取权人（边际），而效率要求每个代理人单独成为剩余索取权人。