We consider the design of the optimal dynamic policy for a firm subject to moral hazard problems. With respect to the existing literature we enrich the model by introducing durable capital with partial irreversibility, which makes the size of the firm a state variable. This allows us to analyze the role of firm's size, separately from age and financial structure. We show that a higher level of capital decreases the probability of liquidation and increases the future size of the firm. Although analytical results are not available, we show through simulations that, conditional on size, the rate of growth of the firm, its variability, and the variability of the probability of liquidation decline with age.

中文翻译：

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最优财务契约与企业规模的影响

我们考虑了为一个存在道德风险问题的公司设计最优动态政策。相对于现有文献，我们通过引入具有部分不可逆性的持久资本来丰富模型，这使得公司的规模成为状态变量。这使我们能够分析公司规模的作用，与年龄和财务结构分开。我们表明，较高的资本水平会降低清算的可能性并增加公司的未来规模。尽管无法获得分析结果，但我们通过模拟表明，以规模为条件，公司的增长率、其可变性以及清算概率的可变性随着年龄的增长而下降。