In this paper, we examine the viability of avoiding value judgments encoded in thick concepts when these concepts are used in economic theories. We focus on what implications the use of such thick concepts might have for the tenability of the fact/value dichotomy in economics. Thick concepts have an evaluative and a descriptive component. Our suggestion is that despite attempts to rid thick concepts of their evaluative component, economists are often not successful. We focus on the strategy of explication to remove the evaluative component of thick concepts and argue that often economists either have to make value judgments or are unable to individuate out the phenomenon under analysis. We support our claim with a case study, namely the concept of addiction in Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction (1988). One consequence of our analysis is that theories containing thick concepts could commit economists to making value judgments and as such undermine the fact/value dichotomy.

在本文中，我们研究了将这些概念用于经济理论中时，避免采用粗略概念编码的价值判断的可行性。我们关注的是，使用如此笼统的概念可能会对经济学中事实/价值二分法的持久性产生什么影响。粗略的概念具有评估和描述性成分。我们的建议是，尽管尝试摆脱其评估成分的繁琐概念，但经济学家通常并不成功。我们将重点放在说明性策略上，以消除复杂概念的评估成分，并认为经济学家常常不得不做出价值判断，或者无法区分正在分析的现象。我们通过案例研究来支持我们的主张，即加里·贝克尔（Gary Becker）和凯文·墨菲（Kevin Murphy）的理性成瘾理论中的成瘾概念（1988）。我们分析的结果之一是，包含深层概念的理论可能会使经济学家做出价值判断，从而破坏事实/价值二分法。