This paper investigates how green credit regulation affects firms' loan conditions and their economic and environmental performance. In a simple theoretical model, with strengthened green credit regulations, banks raise loan interest rates to nonabatement firms. Firms that were formerly indifferent to pollution abatement must redetermine their abatement and production strategies. Using disaggregated firm-level data, we find that, after the reinforcement of green credit regulation, noncompliant firms saw a larger increase in interest rates, decrease in loan amounts, and more difficulty in access to loans. We further find different impacts on large and small firms in terms of their loans and their financial and economic responses. Regarding the impact on firms’ environmental performance, although all of these firms reduced their total emissions, the reductions are realized in dissimilar ways; large firms reduced their emission intensity by investing more in adopting abatement facilities, while small firms simply choose to produce less.

本文研究了绿色信贷监管如何影响企业的贷款条件及其经济和环境绩效。在一个简单的理论模型中，随着绿色信贷监管的加强，银行提高了对非减排企业的贷款利率。以前对污染减排漠不关心的公司必须重新确定他们的减排和生产战略。通过分拆企业层面数据，我们发现，强化绿色信贷监管后，违规企业的利率上升幅度较大，贷款额度下降，贷款难度加大。我们进一步发现，就贷款及其财务和经济反应而言，对大型和小型公司的影响不同。关于对企业环境绩效的影响，尽管所有这些企业都减少了总排放量，减少以不同的方式实现；大公司通过加大对减排设施的投资来降低排放强度，而小公司只是选择减少生产。