Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and genuinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can’t. I begin by explicating Husserl’s theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a subject to re-inhabit a world of others from out of this sphere. In querying Husserl’s theory, I consider a series of problems, raised by Zhida Luo, concerning the apparent centrality of bodily similarity in empathy. I sketch Luo’s solution, which involves a shift to tactile similarity. While it makes for a better theory of empathy, this solution isn’t sufficient to make room for the givenness of another person not originally predicated on similarity. To clarify what’s at issue here, I turn to the Husserlian pictures of empathy presented by Heinz Kohut and Edith Stein. I conclude with a remark about what might be required, given the inability of Husserlian empathy to make room for the experience of others as singular and other, for a picture of our phenomenal life to have a shape that accounts for the coexistence of empathy to others who are like oneself and hospitality to others as genuine others.

其他人认为我们的世界经验；他们给我们留下了独特而真实的印象。本文探讨了胡塞尔人的同理心作为我们构成主体间世界的方式是否可以解释我们经验中其他人的独特性和其他性。我认为不能。首先，我将阐述胡塞尔的移情理论，尤其要注意对纯粹自我领域的简化，以及表面上允许主体从这个领域重新居住的其他世界的步骤。在质疑胡塞尔的理论时，我考虑了罗志达提出的一系列问题，这些问题涉及移情中身体相似性的明显中心性。我概述了罗的解决方案，其中涉及到触觉相似性的转变。虽然它为同理心提供了更好的理论，这种解决方案不足以为最初不是基于相似性的另一个人的给定空间。为了弄清这里存在的问题，我转向由海因茨·科胡特（Heinz Kohut）和伊迪丝·斯坦（Edith Stein）呈现的关于同理心的胡塞尔照片。最后，我要谈一谈可能需要做些什么，因为胡塞尔人的移情无法为他人的经验（单数或其他）腾出空间，使我们现象化的生活具有某种形状，可以说明移情对他人的共存像自己一样好客，待人如真。