The article argues that there are different ways of justifying suspension of judgement. We suspend judgement not only privatively, that is, because we lack evidence, but also positively, that is, because there is evidence that provides reasons for suspending judgement: suspension is more than the rational fallback position in cases of insufficient evidence. The article applies the distinction to recent discussions about the role of suspension for inquiry, Turri's puzzle about withholding, and formal representations of suspension.

中文翻译：

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合理暂停

文章认为，有不同的方式来证明中止判断的正当性。我们中止判决不仅是因为我们缺乏证据，而且是积极的，即因为有证据提供了中止判决的理由：在证据不足的情况下，中止不仅仅是理性的退避立场。这篇文章将这一区别应用于最近关于暂停调查的作用、图里关于扣留的谜题以及暂停的正式表示的讨论。