There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer–Ranchin, Chalmers–McQueen and Okon–Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers–McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information theory” (IIT) of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers–McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions, namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers. In defence of Chalmers–McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form of any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.

最近发展维格纳假说的兴趣激增，该假说是通过探索动态崩溃模型来发现有意识的观察会导致崩溃的，而动态崩溃模型中一些据称可量化的意识抵抗叠加。克雷姆尼泽-兰钦（Kremnizer-Ranchin），查尔莫斯-麦奎因（Chalmers-McQueen）和奥孔-塞巴斯蒂安（Okon-Sebastián）曾探索过这样的观念，即崩溃可能与意识的数字量度有关。最近，查尔默斯·麦奎因（Chalmers–McQueen）认为任何单一的量度都是不充分的，因为它可以使相同意识量度的不同状态的叠加持续存在。他们认为，一个令人满意的模型需要将崩溃与量化意识各个方面的一系列措施相关联，例如Tononi等人定义的“ Q形”。在他们的意识的“综合信息论”（IIT）中。我在这里辩称，查尔默斯·麦昆（Chalmers–McQueen）反对将单个度量与崩溃联系起来的论点要求与不同经历相关的大脑状态之间具有精确的对称性，因此不适用于唯一具有强烈直觉的情况，即人类（或其他陆地生物学）观察者。为了捍卫查尔默斯·麦昆的立场，有人认为理想化的人工信息处理网络可以表现出这种对称性。但是，我认为，假设从网络状态到思维状态的映射的任何理论（例如IIT）的最自然形式是将相同的思维状态分配给同构网络状态的一种形式（就像IIT所做的那样）。这表明，如果存在这样的地图，就不会有心智状态的熟悉组成部分，例如查看不同的颜色或感到愉悦或痛苦，