Despite several high-profile cases of cooperation between sanctioned states, little is understood about how being sanctioned affects target states’ incentives to cooperate with one another and what forms that cooperation might take. I theorize that sanctioned states will tend to seek out sanctions-surviving assistance from nonsanctioned states in most cases. Being sanctioned constrains how much useful assistance that sanctioned states can provide to one another, as they suffer from similar trade constraints, levels of economic turmoil, and governmental resource limitations. I test my theory's predictions that sanctioned states are less likely to cooperate with one another via two different large-n tests involving cooperation via engaging in trade-based sanctions-busting and civil nuclear cooperation. Both of these distinct tests provide strong support for my theory. The final portion of the study conducts an exploratory analysis of why sanctioned states still sometimes cooperate with one another, finding that such cooperation may involve risky or taboo transactions, like arms sales, and that sanctioned parties have incentives to keep their cooperation a secret in such cases. These findings improve our understanding of the various cooperative strategies that states employ to survive sanctions.

中文翻译：

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物以类聚，受制裁的国家会聚集在一起吗？

尽管受制裁国家之间发生了几起引人注目的合作案例，但人们对受制裁如何影响目标国家相互合作的动机以及合作可能采取的形式知之甚少。我的理论是，在大多数情况下，受制裁的国家会倾向于从未受制裁的国家寻求经受制裁的援助。受到制裁限制了受制裁国家可以相互提供多少有用的援助，因为它们受到类似的贸易限制、经济动荡程度和政府资源限制。我检验了我的理论的预测，即受制裁国家不太可能通过两种不同的大 n 测试相互合作，这些测试涉及通过参与以贸易为基础的制裁破坏和民用核合作的合作。这两个不同的测试都为我的理论提供了强有力的支持。研究的最后部分对受制裁国家为何有时仍相互合作进行了探索性分析，发现此类合作可能涉及风险或禁忌交易，如军售，并且受制裁方有动机在此类合作中保密。案例。这些发现提高了我们对各国为应对制裁而采用的各种合作策略的理解。