‘Artificial womb’ technology is highly anticipated for the benefits it might have as an alternative to neonatal intensive care and for pregnant people. In the bioethical literature, it has been suggested that such technology will force us to rethink the ethics of abortion. Some scholars have suggested that a pregnant person may be entitled to end a pregnancy but, with the advent of ectogestation, they may not be unilaterally entitled to opt for an abortion where the other genetic progenitor does not agree. Following two high-profile cases in England and Wales in the late 70s and 80s, English law is clear that genetic progenitors who do not gestate have no say in abortion decisions. It might be argued, however, that ectogestation casts doubt on the exclusion of all claims by genetic progenitors. In this article, I assess what a legal challenge to a decision to opt for abortion might look like with the advent of this technology, by examining whether genetic progenitors have the locus standi or grounds to seek an injunction to prevent abortion. I argue that such a challenge is unlikely to be successful.

中文翻译：

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堕胎和“人工子宫”：“人工子宫”技术是否会合法地授权非妊娠遗传祖细胞参与有关如何在英格兰和威尔士终止妊娠的决定？

“人工子宫”技术因其作为新生儿重症监护和孕妇的替代方案可能带来的好处而备受期待。在生物伦理文献中，有人提出这种技术将迫使我们重新思考堕胎的伦理。一些学者认为，怀孕的人可能有权终止妊娠，但随着异胎妊娠的出现，他们可能无权在其他遗传祖细胞不同意的情况下单方面选择堕胎。在 70 年代末和 80 年代在英格兰和威尔士发生两起备受瞩目的案件之后，英国法律明确规定，未怀孕的遗传祖细胞在堕胎决定中没有发言权。然而，有人可能会争辩说，体外妊娠对排除遗传祖细胞的所有主张产生了怀疑。在本文中，我评估了随着这项技术的出现，对选择堕胎的决定所面临的法律挑战可能会是什么样子，通过检查遗传祖细胞是否具有寻求禁止堕胎禁令的地位或理由。我认为这样的挑战不太可能成功。