The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.

从事罪恶行业（酒精、烟草、赌博和枪支）的公司的产品和服务与社会规范背道而驰，并可能对社会产生重大的负面外部影响。因此，我们预计，如果犯罪公司的避税行为受到审查，他们将面临更大的风险，即以额外监管、更高的消费税或资本市场干预的形式产生政治成本。由于其产品的性质，监管机构和政策制定者在针对这些公司的新法规或税收方面可能面临较少的阻力。与非罪恶行业的企业相比，罪恶企业开始影响政治进程的能力较低。因此，我们假设并发现犯罪公司比非犯罪公司表现出更少的避税行为，特别是通过不确定和风险更大的避税策略。在通过密集游说活动积累政治资本的公司中，犯罪公司的地位与避税之间的负相关关系不太明显。利用党派控制国会和白宫的变化，差异测试表明，当民主党（共和党）同时控制国会和白宫时，枪支公司的避税行为更少（更多）。总体而言，我们得出结论，政治成本在企业避税决策中发挥着重要作用。差异测试表明，当民主党（共和党）同时控制国会和白宫时，枪支公司的避税行为较少（较多）。总体而言，我们得出结论，政治成本在企业避税决策中发挥着重要作用。差异测试表明，当民主党（共和党）同时控制国会和白宫时，枪支公司的避税行为较少（较多）。总体而言，我们得出结论，政治成本在企业避税决策中发挥着重要作用。