While boards around the globe are becoming more international, the reasons behind this internationalization are not fully understood. In this study, we suggest that foreign ownership increases the presence of foreign directors on boards. Based on resource dependence theory, we argue that the dependence on foreign owners makes foreign nationals an important resource for firms. Using data from large Japanese stock market firms and employing logistic regression analysis, we find empirical evidence that greater dependence on foreign, i.e. gaijin, owners is associated with a higher probability to have foreign directors on the board. We also demonstrate that the link between foreign ownership and foreign directors is positively moderated by a firm’s foreign market exposure. We conclude that firms consider foreign directors a viable response to the deviant expectations of foreign owners.

虽然全球的董事会正变得越来越国际化，但人们尚未完全了解这种国际化背后的原因。在这项研究中，我们建议外资所有权增加了外国董事在董事会中的存在。基于资源依赖理论，我们认为对外国所有者的依赖使外国人成为企业的重要资源。使用日本大型股票市场公司的数据并采用逻辑回归分析，我们发现经验证据表明对外国的依赖程度更高，即gaijin, 所有者在董事会中有外国董事的可能性更高。我们还证明了外国所有权和外国董事之间的联系受到公司外国市场敞口的积极调节。我们得出的结论是，公司认为外国董事是对外国所有者异常期望的可行回应。