Worker cooperatives seek both compliance with cooperative principles or “cooperativism” and economic efficiency. To fill the evidence gap on whether the two goals collide or coincide, we drawn on microdata including over 7,000 Brazilian cooperatives. Stochastic frontier models were used to estimate the relative level of efficiency and to relate it with cooperativism level measured as participatory decision-making and integration to cooperatives’ networks. Results showed that the former dimension of cooperativism presented a positive effect that dominated the negative effect of network integration. So that efficiency (weakly) increased with an index aggregating the two cooperativism’s dimensions. This was coherent with case studies attesting Brazilian cooperatives capacity to overcome threats to efficiency with organizational changes including the introduction of probation, dismissing and hiring of non-member workers, thus preserving core principles. Results were also consistent with theoretical studies which both argue that shirking and high transaction costs are the main threats to efficiency facing cooperatives and also that these are mitigatable by common principles fostering consensus and a participatory environment minimizing conflicts and disclosing private information. Government support to creation of cooperatives is recommendable as a poverty alleviation policy whether homogeneous social groups more prone to mutual trust are prioritized.

工人合作社既寻求遵守合作社原则或“合作主义”，又寻求经济效率。为了填补这两个目标是冲突还是一致的证据空白，我们利用了包括7,000多个巴西合作社在内的微观数据。随机前沿模型用于估计效率的相对水平，并将其与作为参与式决策制定和合作社网络整合而衡量的合作主义水平联系起来。结果表明，合作主义的前一个维度表现出了积极的作用，而主导了网络整合的消极作用。因此，通过将两个合作主义的维度进行汇总的指数，效率（微弱地）提高了。这与案例研究相吻合，这些案例证明了巴西合作社克服组织变革等效率挑战的能力，包括实行缓刑，解雇和雇用非成员工人，从而保留了核心原则。结果也与理论研究一致，理论研究既认为逃避和高交易成本是合作社面临的主要威胁，也可以通过促进共识的共同原则和最小化冲突并公开私人信息的参与性环境来克服。建议将政府对建立合作社的支持作为一项扶贫政策，是否优先考虑更倾向于相互信任的同质社会群体。因此保留了核心原则。结果也与理论研究一致，理论研究既认为逃避和高交易成本是合作社面临效率的主要威胁，又可以通过促进共识的共同原则和最小化冲突和公开私人信息的参与性环境来克服。建议将政府对建立合作社的支持作为一项扶贫政策，是否优先考虑更倾向于相互信任的同质社会群体。从而保留了核心原则。结果也与理论研究一致，理论研究既认为逃避和高交易成本是合作社面临的主要威胁，也可以通过促进共识的共同原则和最小化冲突并公开私人信息的参与性环境来克服。建议将政府对建立合作社的支持作为一项扶贫政策，是否优先考虑更倾向于相互信任的同质社会群体。结果也与理论研究一致，理论研究既认为逃避和高交易成本是合作社面临效率的主要威胁，又可以通过促进共识的共同原则和最小化冲突和公开私人信息的参与性环境来克服。建议将政府对建立合作社的支持作为一项扶贫政策，是否优先考虑更倾向于相互信任的同质社会群体。结果也与理论研究一致，理论研究既认为逃避和高交易成本是合作社面临效率的主要威胁，又可以通过促进共识的共同原则和最小化冲突和公开私人信息的参与性环境来克服。建议将政府对建立合作社的支持作为一项扶贫政策，是否优先考虑更倾向于相互信任的同质社会群体。