Modern thinking about democracy is largely governed by the concept of constituent power. Some versions of the concept of constituent power, however, remain haunted by the spectre of totalitarianism. In this article, I outline an alternative view of the identity of the people whose constituent power generates democratic authority. Broadly speaking, constituent power signifies the idea that all political authority, including that of the constitution, must find its source in some idea of ‘the people’, whose authority is never exhausted by constituted power. The deficiency I seek to address is that of asking who the people is to whom any claim of authority refers, while avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism. I show the most famous totalitarian view of constituent power – advanced by Carl Schmitt – to be not only politically unsavoury but also ontologically unjustified. To outline my alternative view, I draw on Jacques Derrida’s concept of just decisions to argue that the undecidable inaugurates collective responsibility by demanding a response. This suggests a view of ‘the people’ as a doing rather than a being. I conclude by showing how this avoids totalitarian views of popular sovereignty by demonstrating its congruency with Claude Lefort’s democratic theory as opposed to totalitarianism.

关于民主的现代思想在很大程度上受制于组成权力的概念。然而，极权主义的幽灵仍然困扰着组成权力概念的某些版本。在本文中，我概述了其组成力量产生民主权威的人们的身份的另一种观点。广义上讲，制宪权意味着所有政治权威，包括宪法的权威，都必须从某种“人民”观念中找到源头，这种观念永远不会被制宪政权用尽。我要解决的缺陷是，要问人民是谁，谁有权要求谁，却要避免极权主义的陷阱。我展示了卡尔·施密特（Carl Schmitt）提出的最著名的极权主义极权主义观点，不仅在政治上是卑鄙的，而且在本体论上也是不合理的。为了概述我的另一种观点，我借鉴了雅克·德里达（Jacques Derrida）的公正决策概念，认为这种不确定性要求回应，从而引发了集体责任。这表明人们将“人民”视为一种行为，而不是一种存在。最后，我将通过展示其与克劳德·莱福特的民主理论（而不是极权主义）的一致性来说明如何避免大众主权的极权主义观点。这表明人们将“人民”视为一种行为，而不是一种存在。最后，我将通过展示其与克劳德·莱福特的民主理论（而不是极权主义）的一致性来说明如何避免大众主权的极权主义观点。这表明人们将“人民”视为一种行为，而不是一种存在。最后，我将通过展示其与克劳德·莱福特的民主理论（而不是极权主义）的一致性来说明如何避免大众主权的极权主义观点。