ABSTRACT

This article shows how governance failures within sport governing bodies promote opportunity structures for the manipulation of competitions. Based on a triangulation of qualitative methods, including interviews with key sport actors, the paper describes the structural constraints by which football referees may accept to perform their role while favouring one of the teams and, consequently, to apply the regulations with partiality and injustice. Cultural and relational constraints are presented and explained. Among the cultural ones, the work identifies a selective application of formal rules, the normalisation of abnormality, and the subsequent formalisation of abnormality. At the relational level, direct asymmetric relationships, indirect asymmetric relationships, and symmetric relationships are discussed. Since wrongdoing and the manipulation of competitions are understood by some referees as a necessary condition to progress in their career or to keep it ongoing, findings reinforce the importance of paying attention to the theories of social structure, and at the meso level, to explain the phenomenon of match fixing. Empirical and theoretical contributions support the need for developing anti-match fixing policies according to the social contexts in which sports actors are involved. It also opens a line of debate on the need to control externally and independently the Sport Governing Bodies.

摘要

本文展示了体育管理机构内部的治理失败如何促进操纵比赛的机会结构。基于定性方法的三角测量，包括与主要体育演员的访谈，本文描述了足球裁判在支持其中一支球队的情况下可能接受的结构性约束，从而以偏颇和不公正的方式应用规则。提出并解释了文化和关系限制。在文化方面，该作品确定了对形式规则的选择性应用、异常的规范化以及随后的异常的形式化。在关系层面，讨论了直接非对称关系、间接非对称关系和对称关系。由于一些裁判认为不当行为和操纵比赛是职业发展或保持职业发展的必要条件，因此研究结果强调了关注社会结构理论的重要性，并在中观层面解释假球现象。实证和理论贡献支持根据体育演员参与的社会背景制定反比赛造假政策的必要性。它还开启了关于外部和独立控制体育管理机构的必要性的辩论。解释比赛造假现象。实证和理论贡献支持根据体育演员参与的社会背景制定反比赛造假政策的必要性。它还开启了关于外部和独立控制体育管理机构的必要性的辩论。解释比赛造假现象。实证和理论贡献支持根据体育演员参与的社会背景制定反比赛造假政策的必要性。它还开启了关于外部和独立控制体育管理机构的必要性的辩论。