Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject’s environment has those properties or stands in those relations. This paper makes the case for perceptual illusionism by showing how a broad set of philosophical and scientific considerations converge to support illusionism about the full range of sensible properties and relations. After clarifying the illusionist thesis, I set out the argument in three parts. First, I briefly make the case for an illusionist view of color. I then argue for illusionism about the spatial/temporal properties presented in experience on the assumption that some “radical” view of space (and/or time) is correct—that is, some view according to which nothing like our ordinary three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime) exists at the fundamental level. Finally, I argue that there is a strong case for illusionism even if all radical views turn out to be false..

中文翻译：

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感性幻觉

知觉幻觉论认为，一般来说，知觉经验是极度虚幻的。也就是说，感性经验将对象呈现为具有某些可感属性并处于某些可感关系中，但主体环境中没有任何东西具有这些属性或处于这些关系中。本文通过展示一系列广泛的哲学和科学考虑如何汇聚以支持关于所有可感属性和关系的幻觉，从而为感性幻觉提供了理由。在澄清了魔术师的论点后，我分三个部分阐述了论点。首先，我简要地为色彩的幻觉观点提出理由。然后，我在假设某些“激进”的空间（和/或时间）观点是正确的前提下，就经验中呈现的空间/时间属性提出幻觉论——也就是说，一些观点认为，在基本层面上没有任何东西像我们普通的三维空间（或四维时空）存在。最后，我认为，即使所有激进观点都被证明是错误的，幻觉主义也有充分的理由。