In this paper, a novel hardware attack based on principal component analysis (PCA) is proposed to break a leakage power analysis (LPA)-resistant cryptographic circuit (CC) efficiently. Although the added false keys which are used for masking the secret key of the LPA-resistant CC are secure and effective against regular LPA attacks, they may be precisely modeled by eigenvalues and eigenvectors under PCA. After performing the proposed PCA on the LPA-resistant CC, all the added false keys can be removed to expose the corresponding secret key. As shown in the result, only 2000 number of plaintexts are sufficient to crack an LPA-resistant CC by utilizing the proposed PCA-assisted LPA attacks.

本文提出了一种基于主成分分析（PCA）的新型硬件攻击技术，可以有效地打破耐泄漏功率分析（LPA）的密码电路（CC）。尽管添加的用于掩盖LPA抵抗性CC的秘密密钥的伪密钥是安全且有效的，可抵御常规LPA攻击，但可以通过PCA下的特征值和特征向量对其进行精确建模。在耐LPA的CC上执行建议的PCA之后，可以删除所有添加的伪密钥以暴露相应的秘密密钥。如结果所示，通过利用建议的PCA辅助LPA攻击，仅2000数量的纯文本足以破解抗LPA的CC。