We analyze a stylized creative region’s economy. There are two goods (consumption and creative capital) and creative class members differ in their income generating abilities. The distribution of abilities in the creative class population is such that the median ability is less than the average ability. There is a proportional income tax rate and all tax revenues are redistributed to the creative class members by the regional authority (RA) with a uniform, lump-sum transfer. In this setting, we perform four tasks. First, we determine the tax rate that maximizes the lump-sum transfer. Second, we show that income equality requires the tax rate to equal unity and that the poorest creative class member is better off with a lower tax rate and hence more inequality. Third, given the \(ith\) creative class member’s preference over the tax rate and the transfer, we ascertain the tax rate that will be chosen by majority voting. Finally, we discuss the connection between increasing inequality and the majority chosen tax rate.

我们分析了风格化创意区域的经济。有两种商品（消费和创意之都）和创意阶层成员不同，他们的创收能力。能力在创意类人群中的分布应使中位能力小于平均能力。有一个成比例的所得税税率，所有税金都由区域主管部门（RA）通过统一的一次性总转移重新分配给创意类成员。在此设置中，我们执行四个任务。首先，我们确定使一次性总转移最大化的税率。其次，我们证明了收入平等需要税率相等，而最贫穷的创意阶层成员的税率越低越好，因此不平等现象也越多。第三，鉴于\（ith \）广告素材类成员对税率和转移的偏好，我们确定将由多数表决选择的税率。最后，我们讨论了不平等加剧与多数选择的税率之间的联系。