In this article, the epistemological interpretation of the relationship between concepts of relativism, beliefs, and probability ensures a defense of two theses, namely, (i) epistemic relativism refers to attitudes that depend on the repetition and anchoring of probabilistic beliefs, and (ii) Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability discloses the connections between relativity, probability, and collective subjectivity. The propensity interpretation brings a framework for describing the role of collective subjectivity in epistemic systems. This approach, as an acceptable epistemological stance, is related to the variability of anchored collective beliefs. The repetition and anchoring of subjective probabilistic beliefs becomes a relative reference frame for evaluating the elements of knowledge. With this in mind, each particular way of considering probability indicates a manner of distinguishing epistemic systems. In epistemic systems, the statements are collective points of view expressed in the form ‘p is justified when belief in p is probably reliable.’ The statements can be accurate in a particular epistemic system but inaccurate in other systems. As a result, by avoiding the ‘all statements must be true or false’ requirement, each proponent of a certain epistemic system can build a probabilistic picture of the world. In this picture, not every statement needs to be ‘true’ when and if the statement expresses a collective point of view that has a propensity to be reliable and justified.

在本文中，对相对论，信念和概率之间关系的认识论解释确保了以下两个观点的辩护：（i）认知相对论是指依赖于概率信念的重复和锚定的态度，并且（ii波普尔对概率的倾向性解释揭示了相对性，概率和集体主观性之间的联系。倾向性解释带来了一个框架，用于描述集体主观性在认知系统中的作用。作为可接受的认识论立场，这种方法与锚定的集体信念的可变性有关。主观概率信念的重复和锚定成为评估知识要素的相对参考框架。考虑到这一点，每种考虑概率的特定方式都表明了区别认知系统的方式。在认知系统中，陈述是以“当相信p可能是可靠的时，p是合理的。这些陈述在特定的认知系统中可能是准确的，但在其他系统中则是不准确的。结果，通过避免“所有陈述都必须为真或假”的要求，某个认知系统的每个支持者都可以建立世界的概率图。在这种情况下，并非每一个陈述都必须是“真实的”，只要该陈述表达了倾向于可靠和合理的集体观点。